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Abstract 
 
This article traces the development of Cuban analyses of Arab migration to the island from the 
1500s to the present. It asks whether there is a specifically “Cuban” school of “migration 
studies,” analysing the nature and implications of Ortiz’s concept of transculturation 
underpinning the post-colonial development of “Cuban national identity.” It further argues that, 
despite official Cuban claims regarding post-revolutionary racial equality, Arab migration has 
not only been historically and politically marginalised in accounts of the development of “Cuban 
identity”, including in Ortiz’s own work, but diverse “waves” of Arab migration to the island 
have been characterised by what I refer to as the accumulative “footnoting of Islam.” In 
conclusion, I argue that Muslim Arab immigration prior to the Cuban Revolution has been 
entirely overshadowed by a systematic focus on Christian Arabs, in effect leading to the category 
“Arab” being practically synonymous with “Christian” or “Maronite”, with wide-ranging 
implications for our understanding of Cuba’s academic and political discourses regarding 
national identity in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
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Introduction 
Since the 1980s, the Cuban population’s “Arab component” has been documented by key Cuban 
institutions, including the Oficina del Historiador de la Ciudad de la Habana (Office of the 
Historian of the City of Havana), the anthropological Fundación Fernando Ortiz (henceforth 
‘Fundación’), and the Unión Árabe de Cuba (“Cuba’s Arab Union”). Such Cuban studies of 
immigration systematically assert that one thousand “Arabs” were living in Cuba by 1898, 
celebrating many of these Arab-Cubans’ roles as revolutionary soldiers (mambises) in the 1895 
War of Independence (González 1997; Grillo-Candales n.d) and later in Castro’s Revolution 
(Nejme-Franco n.d.). These studies equally celebrate Arab migrants’ success in “assimilating” 
and “integrating” within Cuban society, consistently asserting that Arab immigration to Cuba 
offers “a good example of integration” (González 2003),1 or, more resolutely declaring that, “of 
all immigration [to Cuba], Arab immigrants were the fastest and best in assimilating and 
integrating to our socio-cultural environment” (Perdomo-Lorenzo 1992, n.p.). Cuban authors 
typically continue by stating that these Arab immigrants’ estimated 50,000 “descendents are, 
today, practically indistinguishable from the rest of the Cuban population” (Sánchez-Porro 1994: 
n.p), and that they share the political goal of promoting a strong and unified Cuban national 
identity (González 1997). 
 
This approach to Arab immigration parallels broader studies conducted by the Fundación, various 
Cuban Research Centres including the Centro de Estudios de Africa y el Medio Oriente and 
Departments at the University of Havana, and the state’s Oficina del Historiador, which aim to 
demonstrate the assimilation, integration and wholehearted incorporation of these migrant 
communities into Cuban “national identity.” With specific reference to Arab immigration, 
however, they all make, perpetuate and solidify one major assumption: that Arab immigration to 
Cuba was a Christian phenomenon, with the vast majority of Arab migrants arriving in Cuba 
belonging to Maronite Christian families from the Levant. 
 
Although it is at times recognised, en passant, that “Arab immigration to Cuba was multiethnic, 
multinational and multiconfessional in nature” (Menéndez-Paredes  1998, 54), and that a not 
insignificant proportion of Arab immigrants were Muslim, all academic and institutional studies 
to date focus on Christian immigration to Cuba, rather than exploring or contextualising Arab 
Muslim immigration to the island (i.e. Menéndez-Paredes 2001, esp. 30). This article therefore 
asks why the historical and contemporary presence and experience of Muslim Arabs in Cuba has, 
to all extents and purposes, been marginalised in studies of the island, despite traces of their 
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existence being readily identifiable to interested observers. Indeed, the absence of such analyses 
is particularly notable given that extensive research exists on the multiple trajectories and roles of 
Muslim Arabs across Central and South America (i.e. Klich and Lesser’s edited collection 
[1998]; Jozami 1996; Civantos 2006), and, as Gómez notes vis-a-vis the invisibility of Muslim 
Africans (as opposed to Muslim Arabs) in accounts of migration to Cuba, “it is logical to assume 
that Muslims were arriving in Cuba in proportions similar to those in Mexico. That Cuba never 
developed a reputation as a Muslim haven requires some explanation…” (2005, 33). 
 
While I do not contest Menéndez-Paredes’ assertion that Christian Maronites were, and continue 
to be, the most important religious group of the Arab diaspora in Cuba and across the American 
continent (1999; also Suleiman [1995, 67-85]), this article critiques official Cuban 
anthropological analyses of Arab migration to Cuba which have embraced Christian Arab 
migrants as part of the Cuban Self, whilst displacing the Muslim Arab (as the) Other. I situate this 
discussion within a broader analysis of twentieth century accounts of diverse migrant 
communities’ arrival in Cuba and their contribution to Cuba’s hybrid national-identity.  
Contrasting the multifaceted and longstanding marginalisation of Muslim Arabs with the wealth 
of Cuban studies and political conmemorations of the contributions of Other migrant 
communities (in particular Chinese and Jewish immigrants to Cuba), I explore how, why and to 
what effect such studies of migration are implicated in the broader politics of Cuban national 
identity; in particular, I highlight that long-standing racial and religious hierarchies challenge 
Cuba’s official policy of egalitarianism and racial equality. 
The article therefore firstly explores how Cuban socio-anthropological analyses of Arab 
migration have developed, whether there is a specifically “Cuban” school of “migration studies”, 
and how migration, ethnicity and religion are related to the development of Cuba’s official 
national identity. Secondly, it documents various “waves” of Arab migration to the island, 
arguing that these have been characterised by the accumulative concealment of Islam. Thirdly, it 
provides a preliminary comparative analysis of accounts of Muslim Arab, Chinese and Jewish 
migration to Cuba, asking why certain migrant communities, such as Chinese and Jewish 
migrants, have been the focus of academic and national/political attention while Muslim Arabs 
have effectively been rendered invisible. 
 
Methodological Reflection 
This article draws on insights developed and materials analysed during a three-month fieldwork 
visit to Cuba in 2006. While I had originally arrived in Cuba intending to explore the experiences 
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and expectations of Sahrawi refugee youth participating in Cuba’s internationalist scholarship 
programme (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2014), I soon developed a parallel project comparing Sahrawi 
refugees’ experiences with those of other Muslim Arab students studying in the island (Fiddian-
Qasmiyeh, 2010, 2015). Examining the experiences of Sahrawi, Palestinian, Yemeni and Syrian 
students in Cuba as Muslims, and developing an analysis of the history of Cuba’s scholarship 
programme for citizens and refugees from across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
since the 1960s, led me to argue “that the presence of Muslim Arab youth in Cuba today can be 
understood as constituting a new form of migration – educational migration – that 
supersedes previous forms of connections between the Middle East and Cuba” (ibid, 139). 
This article therefore complements my earlier research on the presence of Muslim Arab students 
in Cuba following the Cuban Revolution, to analyse the broader history of Arab Muslims’ 
presence in Cuba from the 1500s to the present, and the nature of Cuban accounts of Arab 
migration to the island. 
 
During my fieldwork in Havana I interviewed twenty MENA Muslim university students about 
their experiences in Cuba, the internationalist scholarship programme, and their perceptions of 
Cuba’s historical connections to the MENA region, including Arab migration to Cuba. These 
interviews were complemented with informal interviews with four Cuban converts to Islam, and 
over a dozen Cuban academics specialised in different phases of “Arab” immigration to Cuba. 
Participant observation and archival research were completed in Cuban institutions which focus 
on “Arabs in Cuba” and “Arab migration,” such as the Union Árabe de Cuba, the Casa de los 
Árabes, and the Fundación Fernando Ortiz, with extensive materials located in the Centro de 
Estudios de África y el Medio Oriente, in the Oficina del Historiador, in the Biblioteca Nacional 
and in Cuba’s national archives. The Fundación was my research base, and I benefitted from 
regular interviews with and access to publications by members of the Fundación, which has been 
pivotal in developing Cuban analyses of the role of migrant groups as “components” of “Cuban 
national identity.”  
 
Given my focus on Muslim Arab students’ experiences as Muslims in contemporary Havana, I 
became increasingly aware of the invisibility of Islam in mainstream Cuban accounts of Arab 
migration to Cuba, leading to the current analysis, which counterbalances the hypervisibility of 
certain migrants in the official development and reinforcement of Cuban national identity, with 
the effective erasure of Muslim Arabs throughout different historical periods. The article’s 
broadly deconstructive framework, and in particular the decision to centralize that which has 
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previously been assigned a peripheral position, therefore developed following my departure from 
Cuba, as I re-analysed interview transcripts, archival materials and broader literature on the 
history and present of Arabs in Cuba. 
 
1. Cuban analyses of immigration: Hybridisation, transculturation and repress-entation 
Since the 1990s, Cuban academic and national institutions have traced the histories of different 
immigrant groups in Cuba. The Fundación has played a central role publishing analyses of 
“African,” “Chinese,” “Arab,” “Japanese,” “Hebrew,” “Canary”, “French” and “German” 
migration to Cuba, documenting how these and other migrant communities became integral 
components of “Cuban national identity.” The Fundación’s role as the key Cuban academic 
institution producing and disseminating anthropological “knowledge” about histories of 
immigration in/to Cuba cannot be underestimated, and builds directly upon the legacy of 
Fernando Ortiz (1881-1969), the Spanish-Cuban anthropologist after whom the Fundación is 
named. Indeed, two of Ortiz’s interrelated, if at times contradictory, legacies are of particular 
relevance to my analysis.  
 
Firstly, one of Ortiz’s most significant anti-colonial political contributions in the early-20th  
Century was to centralise hybridity in conceptualisations of Cuban national identity,  
simultaneously rejecting the prevailing assumption that Cuban culture was born of Spanish 
colonial roots, and, for the first time, recognising the contribution of “Africans” to Cuba’s 
identity for the first time. Ortiz’s theory of “transculturation” became a key foundation of post-
Revolutionary official discourses of Cuban identity and belonging. Consciously developed “as a 
substitute for the term acculturation” (Ortiz, [1940] 1995, 97) which had been pro/imposed by 
Western sociologists and anthropologists, Ortiz argued in his 1940 study Contrapunteo cubano 
del tabaco y el azucar that the neologism “transculturation” 
better expresses the different phases of the process of transition from one culture to 
another because this does not consist merely in acquiring another culture, which is what 
the English word acculturation really implies, but the process also necessarily involves 
the loss or uprooting of a previous culture, which could be defined as a deculturation. In 
addition it carries the idea of the consequent creation of a new cultural phenomena, which 
could be called neoculturation. (102-103) 
More concretely, Ortiz asserted that “the real history of Cuba is the history of its intermeshed 
transculturations” (98), “an intense, complex, unbroken process of transculturation of human 
groups, all in a state of transition” (103). Centralising the multiple flows of diverse “human 
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groups” to the island, he held that “there were no more important human factors for Cubanity 
[para la cubanidad] than these continuous, radical and contrasting geographical, economic and 
social transmigrations...” (1963, 102, author’s translation).   
 
Through the metaphor of the ajiaco, an intense Cuban stew prepared with leftover ingredients, 
Ortiz identified diverse “human groups” as the ingredients which together form an ever-evolving 
multi-racial, hybrid Cubanity, arguing that  
Cubanidad is not solely to be found in the [stew], but also in the complex process of its 
very formation, [which is both] disintegrative and integrative... being ajiaco, [the Cuban 
nation] is not a prepared stew, but is rather a constant process of cooking... It is for this 
reason that its composition changes and that Cubanidad should have different flavours 
and consistencies depending on whether one tastes [the stew] from the bottom, from the 
pot’s belly, or from [its surface]. (Ortiz [1939]1993, 6-7, author’s translation) 
Cuban national identity is thus conceptualised as inherently multi-racial and “constantly in-
becoming”2 as a result of multidirectional transculturation: 
Throughout a century of commotions, heterogenous elements were united, merged and 
re-merged into a common Cuban consciousness. However, the nation is not yet made, nor 
is its mass integrated. Even today, uninterupted exogenous flows continue to arrive, flows 
of white, black and yellow immigrants, of interests and of ideas, stirring and dissolving 
into the Cuban broth, deferring the consolidation of a definitive and basic national 
homogeneity. (20) 
Indeed, Ortiz’s second major contribution is his detailed documentation of the “human groups” he 
identified as playing a pivotal role in the development of Cuba’s hybrid national identity through 
this continuous process of transculturation.  
 
In a 1939 presentation published in 1940 under the title Los factores humanos de la cubanidad, 
Ortiz poses the question “Which are the human elements which are merged with Cuban life to 
produce Cubanidad?” (1991, 8, author’s translation), subsequently identifying “four great vulgar 
races”:  
It appears simple to classify the human elements combined in Cuba by their races: copper 
Indians, white Europeans, black Africans, and yellow Asians. The four great vulgar races 
have embraced, mixed and re-mixed in our land over generations. 
Indeed, despite resisting imperialist discourses and vocally denouncing classificatory systems “as 
absurd and artificial as the imaginary races invented by the race theorists of the present” ([1940] 
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1995, 23), Ortiz’s conceptualisations of race and cultural groups both throughout his positivist-
inspired criminological research (1910s-1920s) and his subsequent ‘turn’ to transculturalism in 
the 1930s and 1940s, reflect the continued influence of these very frameworks. Hence, a major 
tension exists in Ortiz’s work between centralising the ongoing transculturation of multiple 
migratory flows underpinning a hybrid Cubanidad, and the consistent return to colonial racial 
typologies. 
 
On the one hand, therefore, in Contrapunteo Ortiz refers to the interactions of Cuba’s 
autochtonous inhabitants (“paleolithic Indian”), Spanish colonialists and immigrants, the “steady 
stream of African negroes” and “other immigrant cultures” including “Indians from the mainland, 
Jews, Portuguese, Anglo-Saxons, French, North Americans, even yellow Mongoloids from 
Macao, Canton, and other regions of the sometime Celestial Kingdom” (Ortiz 1995:9). In the 
same text, he further identifies that “in the first waves of immigration came Genoese, Florentines, 
Jews, Levantines, and Berbers... - that is to say, representatives of the Mediterranean culture” 
(100), and that “after the Negroes began the influx of Jews, French, Anglo-Saxons, Chinese, and 
peoples from the four quarters of the globe” (102). 
 
On the other hand, despite highlighting the presence and incorporation of these diverse peoples 
into Cuba’s ajiaco, Ortiz notes that his ongoing research in the 1940s will deal “with the effects 
on Cuba of the transculturations of Indians, whites [sic], Negroes, and Mongols” (1995, 103, 
emphasis added),3 demonstrating a direct continuation with his positivist conceptualisation of 
ethnicity throughout the 1910s, in which his research focused on “representatives of the four 
classical ethnic types: white (Europeans and their descendants), black (Africans), yellow 
(Chinese), and copper (the Yucatecs)” ([1913]1986, 86, author’s translation). A further continuity 
with colonial conceptualisations of race emerges in Ortiz’s hierarchy of most and least influencial 
races in the development of Cuban national identity: he clearly asserts the primary role of the 
white race (identified as the “basic” race), the secondary influence of the black race, and only a 
marginal influence of the “Asiatic races” (ie. ibid; also 1939, 19).  
 
Indeed, whilst “groundbreaking… Ortiz’s work was not revolutionary” (Davies 2000,142), and 
his political and academic legacy is equally paradoxical at times. Most importantly, Ortiz’s 
conceptualisations of both the hybrid sense and consciousness of self referred to by Ortiz as 
Cubanidad y Cubanía (“Cubanness and Cubanity,” 1964), and of the racial composition of 
mestizo Cuban national identity, were directly embraced by the 1959 Cuban Revolution which 
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officially identified and celebrated the four main components of post-colonial Cuban identity as 
“Indian”, “Spanish”, “African” and “Chinese” (López 2009, 195). Ortiz’s typologies and the 
classification of certain groups’ greater or lesser influence on the Cuban nation have been further 
reinscribed through academic work produced inside and outside of Cuba throughout the 1990s 
and 2000s, much of which directly traces its origins to Ortiz’s work (ie Guanche, 2005). 
 
Essentially, the reinscription, legitimation and celebration of specific racial components and 
certain modes of cultural and racial hybridity, following Ortiz, have necessarily been 
accompanied by processes of racial and cultural, but also religious, marginalisation and 
exclusion. It is this system of centralising and heralding certain groups of migrants and particular 
identity markers whilst concealing others, in this case religious markers, which I refer to in this 
article and elsewhere as a mode of repress-entation (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2010, 2014). Such 
processes of exclusion and concealment are evidently multiple, and yet I argue in the remainder 
of this article that particular groups have more readily been “quietly dropped out of sight,” a 
process systematically identified by Almond in his critique of the Orientalist foundations of key 
postmodern thinkers ranging from Hegel to Baudrillard to Žižek (2007, 180).4  
 
On the one hand, this correlates with Scherer’s denunciation, in the context of studies of Chinese 
immigration to Cuba, that “the disproportionate obsession with Afro-Cuban ‘cults,’ shown by 
historians, sociologists and anthropologists alike, has left little space for the exploration of 
‘Chinese religion’ in Cuba” (1998, 9). Indeed, far from the Martian myth of racial democracy in 
post-Revolutionary Cuba and the official denomination of racial discrimination as “unpatriotic 
due to the founding nationalist mythology of racial harmony” (Roland 2006, 152), an expanding 
literature on racial politics in contemporary Cuba identifies and critiques institutionalised and 
popular forms of discrimination and racism against diverse groups (ibid; de la Fuente 2001). 
Hence, it has been widely noted that “The study of racial politics in Post-Soviet Cuba has been 
overwhelmingly framed within a black-white binary,” and that “for the most part… studies on 
race relations and racial politics of Cubans of color in contemporary Cuba have neglected the 
existence of Chinese-Cubans and their role within Cuban race relations and politics” (Ju 2014). 
Importantly, it is possible to trace a parallel with Ortiz’s work in the relative displacement of 
Chinese-Cubans in contrast with the overarching contemporary focus on the “black-white 
binary”: as noted above, Ortiz denominated the “Asian” influence on Cuban national identity as 
being of “tertiary” importance, regularly asserting that “the Cuban ethnic factor can be reduced 
solely to two extremes: white and blacks” (los factores... :16, author’s translation), with his 
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particular focus on “the Cuban integration of blacks and whites” continuing into the 1940s 
([1942] 1993, 141-143).  
 
Nevertheless, despite evidence supporting such denunciations, the Chinese “component” of 
Cuban identity has been nationally celebrated since before the Revolution, and a significant 
amount of research has been conducted on Chinese-Cuban migration and identities by Cuban and 
non-Cuban analysts alike. In particular, studies have traced the importation of those referred to by 
Ortiz as “semi-slave Chinese” (1995, 85) who substituted African slave labour following the 
abolitionist movements of the 1800s, focusing on the exploitation, violence and high mortality 
rates amongst Chinese labourers, and on the extent to which “Many [Chinese labourers] reacted 
[to the harsh conditions] by running away to join the independence struggle [the War of 
Independence]”, noting that “as a reward, the rebel parliament promised them liberty and 
citizenship” (Benton 2010, 160).  Article 29(d) of the 1940 Cuban Constitution, granting Cuban 
citizenship to all foreigners who had fought in the Liberation Army for over a year, built upon the 
rebels’ commitment to “[champion] the idea of a ‘raceless nation’, democratic and inclusive, and 
[validate] the Chinese role in Cuban national identity” (164). Whilst simultaneously being 
considered “by other Cubans to be both essential to Cuban national identity and ‘exotic’ at the 
same time” (Ju 2010, referencing López 2004), their involvement was ultimately “celebrated in a 
monument to the Chinese role in the independence struggle unveiled in Havana in 1946...” (167), 
and has subsequently been documented in detail by academics and politicians alike.  
 
On the other hand, while it is now broadly recognised that particular “human groups” identified 
by Ortiz have been centralised in the Cuban nation-building project to the relative detriment of 
others, so too have these particular groups been either implicitly or explicitly associated by Ortiz 
and his followers with particular religious identities and practices. In effect, Ortiz’s analyses of 
religion typically associate “white” migratory flows with introducing diverse forms of 
Christianity to Cuba (including in particular Catholicism, but also Presbyterian Protestantism, 
Methodist or Baptist beliefs, Ortiz 1939,15) while “black” African transmigrations are associated 
with fetishism, especially amongst the Lucumi. In turn, Ortiz’s references to the religion-
migration nexus also explicitly recognise the surrepticious arrival of “Jews and Judaists” 
(1939,18-19) through subtle means given that “the Jewish culture has always tended to be hidden 
amongst that of other groups, to avoid persecution” (ibid), “infiltrating” Cuba via Portuguese, 
Flemish, Italian, British, French, even German and later North American and Polish migrant 
flows.  
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With 18 lines dedicated to the arrival of Judaism and Jews to Cuba in a 20 page analysis 
entitled “Los factores humanos de la cubanidad” (1939,1-20), it is notable that Ortiz offered no 
such explicit attention to the arrival of Muslim Arab migrants to the island. Furthermore, those 
who have developed analyses of migration to Cuba since Ortiz’s death have reproduced this 
absence. As such, while analyses of ‘Religion in the Work of Fernando Ortiz’ (the title of 
Ramírez-Calzadilla’s 2005 chapter) note that Ortiz recognised that the Spanish Catholicism 
which was imported to the island was historically “influenced by Jewish, Moorish and Medieval 
superstitutions” (2005, 194, emphasis added), and Ramírez-Calzadilla’s  confirms that “Jewish 
immigrants brought their religion through various organizations and synagogues” and that “other 
philosophical religious forms, such as Baha’ism and theosophy, are also currently practiced and 
studied” in Cuba (ibid, 196, emphasis added), neither Ortiz nor subsequent analyses have 
comprehensively explored the presence or legacy of Arab Muslims in Cuba.  
Nonetheless, Ortiz did at times implicitly infer the influence of Islam amongst the 
practices and belief systems of a range of “African” populations whose religious systems he 
typically characterised as “‘underworld witchcraft’ informing criminal activity” (Gomez 2005, 
36). In particular, Ortiz “attempt[ed] to identify Islamic influence among the Lucumi” (36) but 
more broadly noted that:  
The Islamic religion left indelible marks upon the theology of the blacks from the African 
regions... Plenty of Muslim slaves (mandingas, tolofes, fulas macuás, etc) entered Cuba, 
and those who probably referred to the god Olorun as Alá were from the Yorubas. 
Ortiz, cited in ibid 
Indeed, in his 2005 study subtitled The experience and legacy of African Muslims in the 
Americas, Gomez refers to the “problematic scholarship of Fernando Ortiz” as he attempts to 
discern the presence of African (as opposed to Arab) Muslims and “potential Muslims” in Cuba 
from the sixteenth-century onwards through a re-reading of Cuba’s archives. Nonetheless, while 
Gomez ultimately agrees with Ortiz’s “inferential” evidence that “It is inconceivable that the 
Mande, Fulbe and Wolof in Cuba did not include Muslims” given their origin from West Africa 
and the significance of Islamic reform in the region (ibid), neither Ortiz nor Gomez (or, indeed, 
others) have explicitly addressed the arrival of Muslim Arabs from North Africa or the Middle 
East, depite Ortiz’s passing references to Levantine and Amazigh (ie ‘Berber’) migrants to Cuba 
(op cit). 
 
As such, if Scherer regrets the “little space” which has been left for the exploration of the 
experiences and roles of Chinese-Cubans in general and Chinese religion in Cuba in particular 
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(which Scherer largely equates with Confucianism despite Al-Ahari [1999, 447] proposing that 
by 1959 the majority of Muslims in Cuba were Chinese Muslims), I argue that Ortiz and his 
successors at the eponymous Fundación have produced works in which Muslim Arab migration 
in particular, and Islam in general is pushed “out of the centre of their texts and into the 
margins/footnotes/backdrop of their work” (Almond 2007, 183).  
 
I therefore posit that in publications and analyses of Arab migration to Cuba including and 
following Ortiz’s analyses, “Islam is excised because, quite simply, it had no place in the book[s] 
to begin with” (177), and that the marginalisation of the role of Muslim Arabs and Islam by 
Cuban intellectuals before and after the Revolution is paralleled and underpinned by the 
exclusion of Muslim Arabs from the Cuban nation-building project. The deconstructive 
framework espoused in this article therefore leads me to purposefully centralize that which has 
previously been assigned a peripheral position throughout the extensive “archive of knowledge” 
(Foucault 1989, 25) on Arabs in Cuba. This, in turn, leads us to ask whether there is a place for 
Islam and Muslims in contemporary Cuban academia and political projects alike. 
 
Equally, just as Chinese-Cuban focused analyses consider that the erasure of Chinese immigrants 
from historical accounts “promoted, somewhat ambiguously, by the Cuban state and its 
intelligentsia” must be viewed as part of an Orientalist framework (Scherer 1998, 1), so too can 
the systems of repress-entation which have magnified the role played by Christian Arab 
migration, whilst footnoting the history and present of Muslim Arabs in the island. Consequently, 
we can therefore value Scherer’s insight (9) that Cuban analysts’ 
descriptions of essential incomprehension and radical Otherness coincide with the 
Eurocentricity of many nineteenth-century Spanish and Cuban writers. The reason, then, 
why these descriptions are so biased resides in the Eurocentric and “Christian” 
perspectives of observers who had obviously great difficulty in conceiving of religion in 
non-Christian terms. 
As such, just as Ortiz resisted imperialist discourses and denounced colonial racial typologies 
whilst his work embodied a clear tension between his conceptualisation of the ongoing 
transculturation of a truly hybrid Cubanidad and his consistent return to and reification of colonial 
classificatory systems, this tension has continued to be reproduced in academic and political 
rhetoric in the post-revolutionary era: official declarations of egalitarian, hybrid Cuban social and 
national structures are critiqued by Cuban and non-Cuban academics as prioritising the ‘black-
white binary’ and ‘obsession’ with Afro-Cuban ‘cults’ evidenced in much of Ortiz’s work.5 
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Complementing this critique of the continuity of racial and ethnic hierarchies, this article 
highlights the continuity of religious prejudices from the colonial past, with particular reference 
to Arab Muslim migration to the island. This raises a broader question of whether there is a 
“unique” postcolonial Cuban approach to Arab immigration, as argued by Ortiz and his followers, 
or whether Cuban repress-entations of such histories of migration validate and embody a Cuban 
inheritance of Eurocentric and Orientalist legacies. 
 
 
2. Repress-enting Arab Immigration to Cuba 
Despite adhering to Ortiz’s political commitment to identify and celebrate the hybrid foundations 
of a united Cuban national identity through tracing the histories of immigrant groups’ 
“transculturation” in the island, contemporary analyses completed by the Fundación and its 
associates consistently reassert, rather than challenge, certain elements of unilinear acculturation 
models of migrants’ incorporation into their host society, and the prioritisation of particular 
migrant groups’ contributions to Cuba’s society and nation. In addition, or perhaps as a 
precondition, to celebrating Arab immigration to Cuba through terms such as “assimilation” and 
“integration,” these studies invariably declare that, unlike the Jewish or Chinese communities 
which reportedly demonstrated “traditional” isolatory tendencies (Charon 1992, 35), the Arab 
“community assimilated itself immediately and came to have from the first moment, cordial 
relations and work contact with Cuban nationals” (González 1997, 9); Charon ultimately declares 
that Arab immigration to Cuba has been considered to be one of “the most assimilatable” of all 
immigrant groups which arrived in Cuba (1992, 56).  
 
It is perhaps this successful “assimilation” of Arab immigrants into the Cuban nation which has 
led to numerous authors excluding Arabs entirely from overviews of immigration to Cuba, 
thereby consolidating their invisibility. However, several accounts from the early-1900s use 
disparaging terms to refer to Arabs in general and Muslims more specifically, revealing their 
presence in Cuba through the authors’ invocations of Orientalist tropes:  
 
The Turks, as a group, are fanatics, like Muslims in general, and it is therefore not 
advisable to allow them to form large colonies… The Syrians,6 whilst being Ottoman 
subjects, also [sic] have a greater tendency to Europeanise themselves, they don’t practice 
polygamy and they adopt with great ease the customs of their country of immigration. In 
my view they are a thousand times more preferable than the Turkish mahometans. 
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Dollero’s statement (1919, 412) is made with reference to the 3,000 Muslims he estimated resided 
in Cuba at the end of the 1910s, leading us to trace both the ways in which such immigrants 
arrived in Cuba, and how these “antiquated Eurocentric discourses” (Scherer 1998) have persisted 
into contemporary immigration histories in Cuba. 
 
a) A Brief History of (Muslim?) Arab Immigration 
The first historical record of a “Muslim immigrant’s” presence in Cuba derives from the Church 
records of the Parroquia Mayor de la Habana, which documents the baptism of an adult male in 
1593, who took the name Juan de la Cruz upon his conversion to Christianity. Over forty Muslim 
slaves from across West Africa, North Africa and the Middle East were then recorded as having 
arrived in Cuba three years later on the Spanish boat, San Agustín, with a list of these slaves’ 
names and places of origin (West and North Africa) presented by Menéndez-Paredes (1999, 24, 
who numbers the Muslim slaves as 45) and Gomez (2005, 32, whose estimate is 44). However, 
while these slaves’ names are “either clearly or conjecturally” identifiable as Muslim (ibid),7 the 
history of migration from the Middle East and North Africa, and indeed elsewhere, has required 
different levels of religious concealment for numerous purposes.  
 
Recognising Muslim slaves’ arrival from North Africa in turn draws us briefly to the significance 
of Spain, and especially the Canary Islands as a bridge between the North of Africa and the 
Americas. Hence, although ignored (or excluded) by Fajardo-Spínola (1982, 8) in his discussion 
of immigrant groups in the Canaries, Arabs were resident in the Canary Islands from the 1500s, 
with 865 individuals having been identified as Muslims in the Canary Islands Inquisition of 1595, 
including both free and slave men and women (Anaya-Hernández 1986, 37), many of whom were 
prosecuted for the “crime” of practicing Islam (Ronquillo-Rubio 1991, 231). If Arabs in Cuba 
have been denominated as “the most assimilatable” of immigrants, the opposite approach 
developed in the Canaries, whether Muslims had arrived through voluntary or involuntary 
migration from West and North Africa. Ultimately, as Anaya-Hernández notes, Muslims in the 
Canaries were declared to be “the most inassimilatable” of migrants (1986, 38, my emphasis).  
 
Indeed, Spain’s unequivocal rejection of Islam and Muslims, in part due to fears of conversions to 
Islam in its “dominions” (Bristol 2007, 68), led both to the development of Spanish Inquisitorial 
laws (including Spanish royal decrees issued throughout the 16th Century) which explicitly 
prohibited the transportation of Muslims or “moors” to “the New World,” and to the consequent 
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development of mechanisms by which such laws could be by-passed by slave-traders, Cuban 
immigration officers and migrants alike. Indeed, Guanche argues that Jewish immigrants were 
present on all boats travelling to Cuba from Spain throughout the 17th Century, and that they 
gained access to “the New World” by officially declaring their conversion to Christianity (1999, 
18). Guanche here draws on Ortiz, who (as noted above) dedicated a significant proportion of his 
discussion in Los factores humanos to addressing the arrival of Jews since Columbus’ journey, 
and even proposed that “I might remark in passing that Bellester, Aguiló, and Velosa were 
probably of Jewish origin, as was, in the opinion of many, Christopher Columbus” (Ortiz 
Counterpoint, 265). 
 
Whilst Guanche ignores Muslim immigration to Cuba throughout this period, again following in 
Ortiz’s footsteps, a similar strategy of the “apparent negation of the Islamic creed” could also 
have been used by Muslims travelling to “the Americas” in order to hide their “real ethnic 
identity as ‘hispano musulmanes’” (as suggested in passing by Menéndez-Paredes 1999, my 
translation). More directly, Grillo-Candales recognises that Arab immigrants used bribes “to 
hispanise their names to get around the Spanish royal decree forbidding the arrival of Muslims [in 
the New World]” (1998, 19). Claims to conversion and the hispanisation of names,8 reflecting a 
strategic decision to distance the migrant self from Islam, evidently has long-lasting implications 
for investigations into this area: the names given by and for migrants arriving in Cuba cannot be 
utilised as markers of religious identity. Given analysts’ reliance on the self-reporting of names in 
port lists and Cuban baptism and marriage Registers throughout this period, the conclusion that 
Christians predominated migration flows from the Middle East and North Africa is unsurprising. 
The limitations of Cuban analysts’ almost total reliance upon baptism and marriage registries, and 
the presence of “Christian Arab” names in these sources (i.e. Charon 1992, 36), are accentuated 
even further by Menéndez-Paredes’ brief recognition that children whose fathers were Muslim 
and mothers were Catholic were registered in early Cuban censuses as Christian (1999:59). 
 
b) Re-citing Religious Identity and Persecution 
Just as Islam was rendered invisible by immigrants travelling to the New World between the 16th 
and the late-19th century, this trend for religious repress-entation arguably continued from the 
1870s onwards, when the mass arrival of Arab immigrants accelerated. Although Menéndez-
Paredes recognises in passing that Muslim Arabs’ existence in Cuba “became less visible than it 
probably was in reality, due to the [groups’] members having to hide their real identity to survive 
in the colonial society” (2001, 28-29), no detailed analysis has explored how, why and to what 
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effect Muslim Arab migrants should have hidden or marginalised their religious identity 
throughout different periods of Cuba’s history. 
 
During the final decades of the Ottoman Empire (1850s to early-1900s), it is widely recognised 
that “Arab” migrants (often referred to in official records as Turcos and Otomanos – Turks and 
Ottomans)9 often left their region of origin with the intention of travelling to the “Americas” in 
search of a “better life” (Menéndez-Paredes 1999). Between the 1850s and 1870s, migrants from 
Greater Syria (Lebanon, Syria and Palestine) tended to transit through Cuba en route to the 
United States, while approximately 2,000 “Arabs” established small businesses in the island 
between 1870 and 1900 (ibid). For many of these migrants, socio-political and religious 
persecution was presented as a prompting factor behind their departure from the MENA region, 
with the mainstream assumption being that most Arab migrants arriving in Cuba were Christians 
fleeing Ottoman violence.  
 
However, as noted by Suleiman with reference to Arab immigration to the Americas as a whole,  
 
While the Lebanese Christians (who constitute the overwhelming majority of early Arab 
arrivals in the US) partly employ religious persecution and the lack of political and civil 
freedom as the main causes of their emigration from an oppressive Ottoman regime, 
most, if not all, scholars argue that the most important reason for emigration was 
economic necessity and personal advancement.  
1995, 68, my emphasis  
 
Despite asserting that “most, if not all, scholars” recognise the economic motivations of Arab 
migration to the Americas (ranging from the economic problems in Mount Lebanon in the mid-
1800s resulting from the opening of the Suez Canal, changing of commercial routes and the 
substitution of Lebanese silk with Japanese silk), Suleiman equally notes that religious 
persecution was systematically employed by Lebanese Christians, and that “Christian Maronites 
especially cite the 1860 disturbances and massacres as a main factor for their exodus” (69, my 
emphasis). It is this citation and recitation of religious persecution which permeates much Cuban 
work on Arab immigration, and helps us understand the strategic representation of the Arab 
migrant self as a Christian Self, rather than an Arab Muslim Other (also see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 
2014). In this framework, the Ottoman Empire is associated with oppressive Islam, violence and 
persecution, while Arab migrants, whether “in reality” belonging to the Muslim or Christian faith, 
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project themselves as Christian victims and forced migrants in search of a better life, in order to 
maximise a positive reception from their host state. 
In contrast, in the context of the “American society where assimilation into a Eurocentric 
cultural orientation was practically mandatory,” the strategy of choosing “the least offensive” 
national identity label at one point led to “Maronite Syrians” in the US, for instance, deciding to 
call themselves “Syrian-Lebanese,” thereby eliding their religious identity through a more neutral 
national typology (Suleiman 1995, 80-81). 
  
c) Re-covering Islam? 
Given the absence of literature focusing on the experiences of Muslim Arabs in Cuba, it is 
perhaps surprising to note that by 1916, of the 9,000 to 10,000 “Arabs” living in Cuba, 
Menéndez-Paredes estimates in passing that a third to a quarter of these were Muslim (interview, 
Havana, 3 November 2006). Although this is itself a significant proportion, it may reasonably be 
assumed to be an underestimate in light of the abovementioned factors prompting a concealment 
of religious identity. 
 
Such population estimates are particularly pertinent when we compare the total absence of non-
Cuban analyses of Arab migration with the high degree of both Cuban and non-Cuban academic 
interest in Chinese migrants, who were calculated to number 10,300 according to the 1919 
Census. By the time of the 1931 Census,10 24,647 “Chinese” were registered as resident in the 
island,11 while the colonia árabe (the “Arab colony”), including immigrants and their 
descendants, was calculated to surpass 35,000 (Charon 1992).12 By 1943 López indicates that 
“the total Chinese population dropped to 15,822, and by 1953 to 11,834” (2009, 181), while the 
Arab community reportedly continued to increase. Given the numerical comparability between 
Chinese and Arab migrants in the island before the Cuban Revolution, it is firstly notable, as 
indicated above, that so much international attention should have been given to Chinese-Cubans 
in contrast with the absence of non-Cuban analyses of Arab migration; and it is secondly 
significant that the 1959 Revolution should officially celebrate Chinese migration as one of the 
four principal components of Cuban identity, whilst ignoring the Arab component whose 
demographic presence appears to be equal if not higher.  
 
As suggested above, one reason for this post-Revolutionary national(ist) focus on the Chinese 
‘component’ of Cuban national identity may be related to the exploitation, violence and high 
mortality rates experienced by the approximately 150,000 Chinese workers (‘coolies”) who 
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arrived between 1848 and 1874 (Baltar-Rodríguez 1997) to replace African slave labour 
following abolition, and their subsequent revolt to join the independence struggle; despite the 
demographic composition documented in the early-1900s, the physical suffering historically 
underpinning their contribution to the Cuban nation is recognised through monuments, 
commemorations, and identificatory claims: “Even today, Cubans describe their blood as 
Spanish, African, and Chinese, in that order” (Benton 2010, 159). 
 
Nonetheless, despite official marginalisation, brief references to Muslim Arab migrants’ 
experiences, and the diversity of Muslim religious communities in Cuba prior to the Revolution 
can be discerned in published and unpublished accounts associated with the Unión Árabe de 
Cuba (UAC). Hence, Munir-Selman’s undated report located in the UAC’s library documents the 
life of Abdul-Latif Esmein (known in Cuba as “Salvador”), who was the religious leader and 
spiritual guide of the Shi’ite community in the city of Cardenas (Matanzas Province) between 
1930 and 1955. In the UAC’s publication El Árabe, González and López (1997) present an 
interview with Hadhem Muhammad Madlum, who was born in Lebanon in 1895, was renamed 
“Jacinto” upon his arrival in Cuba in 1925 and was aged 100 at the time of interview; in the 
interview, Jacinto reflects on his experiences in Cuba, noting that “I am Muslim, I have my 
misbeja13 [prayerbeads] and I pray at the burials of those Muslims who die [in Cuba].” 
Poignantly, and reflecting the natural decrease in the Muslim Arab community in Cuba, the 
authors report that “when asked who will pray for him when he dies, he says ‘I have recorded, on 
a tape with my own voice, the Quranic verses in Arabic so that they can play it [the tape] before 
they close the grave’”. A final example emerges in an interview with the head of the UAC’s 
Cultural Commission, Maria Deriche, who briefly notes that her father originated from Palestine 
and “was a Muslim all his life”.14 Whilst cursory in nature, these individual and familial accounts 
of Sunni and Shi’ia Arabs around the island suggest the historical existence, experiences and 
heterogeneity of Muslim Arabs in Cuba, and prompt the need for further empirical research into 
this under-researched population; with the passing of time, the collection of first generation 
Muslim Arab migrants’ life histories is becoming, simultaneously, increasingly urgent and 
unfeasible.  
 
To an extent, such examples support the research completed by Morales-Mesa of the Asociación 
Islámica de Cuba (Cuba’s Islamic Association) who recognises that Arab “Muslims also arrived 
[in the 19th and 20th Centuries] who undertook their religious practices on an individual basis” 
whilst arguing that “others converted to Catholicism and very few taught their traditional Islamic 
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practices to their descendents” (2002, 96, emphasis added).15 The individualised nature of 
religious practice, and the limited transmission to the younger generation was asserted more 
stringently by Menéndez-Paredes in our interview, who stated that “the Islam that is practised 
today in Cuba has nothing to do with the presence of Muslim immigrants in the 19th Century or 
20th Century,” further asserting that “there was zero transmission between the generations 
regarding language or religion” and, moreover, that “I don’t know of even one case of an Arab 
immigrant’s child practising Islam” (interview, Havana, 3 November 2006). Despite such claims, 
however, a small number of such instances have been documented to date (see above), and, 
indeed, even if Menéndez-Paredes is correct that second generation Arab-Cubans did not practice 
Islam, third generation Arab-Cubans are asserting a renewed interest in their grandparents’ 
religion: the case of the UAC’s Maria Deriche suggests this trend, since although she herself is 
not Muslim, her granddaughter considers herself to be Muslim.16  
 
Despite an absence of systematic academic interest in Muslim Arabs in Cuba, Islamic inscriptions 
remain centrally located in contemporary Havana, and are readily identifiable to those interested 
in tracing the roots and routes of Arab-Cuban communities, and making a space and a place for 
Islam within Cuban and non-Cuban accounts of this history of migration. Although Qur’anic 
inscriptions are absent from the “Arab neighbourhood” of Monte in Havana (where most research 
has been conducted), a prime example is visible in the patio of a house located on the centrally 
located 23rd Street in Havana (plate 1), whose entrance is adorned with ceramics which document 
the religious convictions of the pre-Revolutionary owners of this building, declaring “Walā ghālib 
ilā Allah”: “There is no conqueror but Allah”. 
 
>>INSERT FIG 1 
 
Such inscriptions (which can also be identified, for instance, in Esmein’s town of Cardenas), in 
addition to the labelling of geographical and topological features across the island require further 
analysis: for instance, it is necessary to investigate the history of naming the Cueva de los 
Musulmanes (the “Cave of the Muslims”) and the Sendero de los Musulmanes (the “Path of the 
Muslims”) in Varadero, and the Playa de los Musulmanes (the “Beach of the Muslims”) in 
Esmein’s province of Matanzas, and to establish whose absence (following de Saussure) is 
denoted by these abstract and tangible “signs” alike.  
 
19 
 
Establishing by whom, when and why these geographical features were associated 
with“Muslims,” and when and why the eponymous Muslims themselves were absented from 
Cuba’s socio-political landscape, is particularly significant given that religious identifiers were 
entirely absent from the titles and stated purposes of the dozens of social, political and 
philanthropic organisations which emerged between the early-1900s and the mid-1950s, 
including the Oriental Union (1904), the Syrian Advancement Society (1918), the Palestinian 
Arab Society (1919) and the Lebanese Society (1920): none of the thirty “Arab” associations 
registered by the Cuban state during the 1900s had either an implicit or explicit connection with 
Islam.17 In direct contrast, the vast array of Jewish organisations established at the time 
specifically drew upon and highlighted religious identity and practice: for instance, “Hebrew 
Religious Community of Cuba”, “Adath Israel Hebrew Religious Community of Cuba”, “United 
Hebrew Religious Society” and “United Hebrew Congregation Temple of Beth Israel”.  
 
Indeed, with comparatively few Jews living in Cuba before the Revolution (estimated to number 
approximately 15,000 by the 1950s - Departamento de Estudios Socioreligiosos 1998), the 
centrality, and public visibility given to religion in such Jewish/Hebrew associations is notable, as 
is the existence of four Jewish schools at this time (no Islamic schools existed), and the 
subsequent wealth of Cuban (ie Sánchez-Porro 1996; López-Levy 2003) and non-Cuban (ie S. 
Kaplan et al. 1990; D. Kaplan 2000; Levine 1993) academic interest in Cuban-Jews. This leads us 
to contrast the discursive and institutional space available for the Jewish religion before and after 
the Revolution, with the continued concealment of Islam in contemporary Cuba.  
 
d) Post-Colonial Demographies, Conmemorations and Arab Spaces 
Following the Cuban Revolution, major socio-political transformations took place in the island, 
including as a result of the nationalization laws first introduced in 1960-1961. Although many 
Arab and non-Arab immigrants and their descendants left after the 1959 Revolution, in the 2000s 
it is estimated that 50,000 Arab-Cubans (first generation immigrants and their descendents) 
continued to live in Cuba. In contrast, 1,200 and 1,500 Cuban-Jews were estimated to reside in 
Cuba in 1992 and 1998 respectively (Departamento de Estudios Socioreligiosos 1998, 64). With 
such a significant difference in the demography of these groups, it is notable that although there is 
no historical record of a functioning mosque having ever existed in Cuba, five synagogues, a 
kosher butchery and two Jewish cemeteries remain available for the small contemporary Cuban-
Jewish community (ibid). It is equally notable that the University of Havana’s Department of 
Socioreligious Studies explicitly documents Judaism’s contemporary role in Cuba (alongside 
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Catholicism, Protestantism, “African religions”, and “Spiritism”) in its “Religious Panorama of 
Cuba” (64); furthermore, the Woodrow Wilson Centre’s workshop report on the impacts of “the 
constant migratory streams” on the development of religions in Cuba indicates that  “The constant 
interplay of belief systems and practices has resulted in the emergence of particularly Cuban 
forms of Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism and Spiritism” (Crahan 2003, 37-54, emphasis 
added). In contrast, neither make any reference to Islam either in the past or present of the island, 
although the Department of Socioreligious Studies’ Morales-Mesa separately recognises the 
existence of Islam in Cuba in two unpublished pieces (1999, 2000) and one published piece 
(2002). 
 
If Ortiz’s interest in the Chinese contribution to Cuban identity, and that of analysts writing after 
him, can be related to the physical suffering experienced by Chinese semi-slaves (as suggested 
above), Ortiz’s attention to the presence and influence of Jewish migrants may in turn be related 
to the historical events taking place in Europe at the time of Ortiz’s most influencial work 
regarding the ‘human factors’ underpinning cubanness and cubanity. With Cuba being one of the 
last countries to continue accepting Jewish refugees in the 1940s,18 at the time of the Second 
World War Ortiz vocally presented an anti-racist, anti-fascist agenda, denouncing Hitler’s racial 
strategies ([1942] 1993, 24) and the expulsion and extermination of the Jews in numerous fora, 
including through a “memorable lecture at the Hebrew Association in Havana” (del Rosario Diaz 
2005, 58) and in publications such as Los factores (1939, 18). Given that post-Revolutionary 
accounts of migration and nation-building explicitly draw upon Ortiz’s work and implicit 
racial/ethinic and religious hierarchies, his numerous references to Jews, Judaism and Judaists in 
his oevre arguably provide the foundations for the academic and political space available to 
document and celebrate the existence and legacy of Jewish migrants to Cuba. 
 
Indeed, both Chinese and Jewish immigration to Cuba are actively commemorated by the Cuban 
government, including through a major government-sponsored “revival” and “restoration” of 
Havana’s Chinatown since 2006 (López 2009, 192), and a “commemorative coin” marked with 
the Star of David celebrating “the work which the Jews contributed to the grandness of the city 
[of Havana]” (Calzada 1997, 4). Notably, however, no similar governmental commemoration or 
recognition has been offered to Muslim Arabs. Furthermore, while the Cuban state has permitted 
the creation of multiple spaces for Jewish-Cubans to practise their religion and transmit a 
religious education to the younger generation (López-Levy 2003), and has celebrated the Chinese 
“saint” Sanfancón (Scherer 1998), the Cuban state has prevented similar attempts to create 
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“popular” Muslim spaces in the island, reportedly rejecting offers made by “several embassies, 
led by the Iranian and Saudi Arabian missions... to build a mosque in Havana” (US DoS 2009).19 
 
A number of Muslim Middle Eastern students interviewed as part of the broader research project 
referred to above suggested that the government’s reluctance was motivated by a fear, which 
perhaps resonates with Spanish Inquisitorial views outlined above, that conversions to Islam 
might occur amongst the Cuban population. Indeed, whilst unrecognised by the majority of 
Cuban and non-Cuban audiences alike, such conversions have been taking place since (at least) 
1992, when Cuba was formally recategorised as “secular” rather than a “Marxist Leninist” state, 
allowing a revitalisation of religious identity and practice across the island (Morales-Mesa 2002, 
94). However, although Jewish missions have visited Cuba from the United States and elsewhere 
since this time, and while conversions to Judaism “from outside” have been documented by 
Kaplan (2000) and López-Levy (2003), similar visits by non-Cuban Muslims,20 and the prospect 
of conversions to Islam have reportedly led to restrictive official state interventions.21  
 
Despite the continued invisibility of Muslim Arabs, a small number of “Arab” spaces in 
contemporary Havana are nonetheless of interest to analysts of Arab migration to Cuba. Firstly, 
the abovementioned Monte neighbourhood is directly associated with the Arabs who settled in 
Havana during the late-19th and early-20th Centuries; however, unlike Havana’s Chinatown, no 
state support has been forthcoming to restore the area. Those Cuban-funded restoration projects 
which have taken place have systematically been monopolised by the Office of the Historiador de 
la Ciudad, which has selected key locations worthy of investment. The prime “Arab” example of 
this was the Historiador’s establishment, in 1983, and more recent refurbishment of the Museo 
Casa de los Árabes, a state-run museum in the core of the tourist area of Old Havana. Whilst 
heralded by the Cuban state, however, neither the building selected in 1983, nor the street/area in 
which the museum is located, are historically related to “Arab” migration. Furthermore, although 
the Casa de los Árabes  is the location of Cuba’s only so-called “mosque,” which was established 
by the state in the 1990s and may be considered to be an officially endorsed “Muslim religious 
space”, it is, firstly, only a small “prayer-room” (muSalla) rather than a mosque (masjid), and is 
typically conceptualised by Muslim residents as “a tourist mosque” for Sunni diplomats and 
Muslim tourists visiting Cuba (also see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2010).  
 
The second “Arab” space is the Union Árabe de Cuba, the institutional core of the “Arab” 
community in Havana, which is equally centrally and strategically located, but is also not 
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historically an “Arab” building or part of an “Arab” neighbourhood. Indeed, the property was 
originally owned by the Union Sionista de Cuba (the Cuban Zionist Union), which was 
reportedly shut down by the Cuban state and handed over to the precursor of the Arab Union in 
1978 (López-Levy 2003, 83). Nonetheless, the UAC has increasingly conducted research about 
Arab migration to the island, and has itself invested in Monte, including by creating a “Memorial 
to Arab Immigrants” in the neighbourhood in 1998 (El Árabe 1998). Despite a minority of UAC 
reports recognising Muslims’ historical presence in Cuba, and despite a small number of its staff 
referring to Islam in our interviews, as a whole the UAC continues to reproduce the official 
stance regarding Arab migration to Cuba, effectively equating Arabs with Maronite Christians.   
  
Conclusion 
Drawing this piece to a close, I argue that there is a particular urgency to make a space and a 
place for Islam within Cuban and non-Cuban accounts of migration, and post-revolutionary 
Cuban national identity alike, beginning with researchers retracing both the presence and absence 
of Muslims in Cuba’s history and present. By centralising references which have until now been 
relegated to margins and footnotes, this article has presented an alternative history to that which 
prevails in official “archives of knowledge” pertaining to Arab migration to Cuba. Tracing the 
accumulative processes of repress-entation which have characterised the official celebration of 
“Arab migrants” as “the most assimilatable” of all immigrant groups, I have argued that this 
assertion’s success is itself dependent upon the apriori erasure of Muslim Arabs from Cuba’s 
hybrid “national identity.” 
 
As is often the case, the arrival of Arab immigrants to Cuba has been analysed according to 
Cuban national priorities. Hence, the ever-expanding number of Cuban analyses of Arab 
migration systematically reflects an official Cuban political commitment which derives in part 
from Cuba’s post-colonial and revolutionary experience: these studies pay homage to the role 
played by different migrant communities in creating “Cuban national identity,” asserting, rather 
than exploring, processes of successful assimilation and integration. 
 
However, Cuban academic and institutional accounts of transculturation and post-revolutionary 
cultural and racial hybridity have simultaneously been characterised by what I refer to as systems 
of religious footnoting, through which particular groups of migrants have been rendered invisible.  
Bearing the legacy of Cuba’s colonial past, throughout different periods of history, Islamic 
identity and practice have been strategically concealed by members of immigrant and “host” 
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populations alike through a variety of mechanisms, ranging from the hispanisation of migrants’ 
names and the “recitation” of claims of religious persecution, to a distinctive process of 
accumulative erasure via a failure to identify or analyse the presence and experiences of Muslim 
Arabs in the island. In effect, Muslim immigration both before and after the Cuban Revolution  
has been overshadowed by a systematic focus on Christian Arabs, thereby leading to the category 
“Arab” being practically synonymous with “Christian,” with wide-ranging implications for our 
understanding of Cuba’s academic and political discourses regarding national identity and both 
racial and religious hierarchies in the twentieth and twenty first centuries alike. In essence, the 
continuity of Muslims’ marginalisation by Cuban academics and officials today leads us to ask 
whether Cuba is now ready to revisit the legacy of colonial systems of repress-entation inherited 
from Spain, and to resist colonial and post-colonial oppositions to Islam. 
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1 All translations from Spanish publications and interviews are my own. 
2 I thank Y.M. Qasmiyeh for his insights regarding this conceptualisation.  
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3 The “four” races are sometimes reduced to three core groups “and others”: for instance, his courses at the 
University of Havana in the 1940s on “Races and historical cultures that have formed the Cuban people” 
focused on “Cultural factors of Indians, Africans, Europeans and others: the phenomenon of their 
transculturation” (in del Rosario-Diaz 2005, 56, emphasis added). Like Ortiz, more recent research by 
Cuban academics oscillates between identifying four or three foundational races – hence, directly referring 
to Ortiz’s work, Núñez refers to the “the various racial fusions… when Indians, Spaniards and Africans 
began to create the racial blend that defines us” (2). 
4 My concern with “religion” clearly reflects my personal and academic interests in the context of the 
contemporary geo-political situation, just as 20th century analysts’ focus on “race” reflected the realities and 
politico-ethical challenges of that era. I thank the reviewer for highlighting this point. 
5 Thanks are due to the anonymous reviewers of this piece for their insights regarding this matter. 
6 In this context, “Syrians” refers to individuals originating from Greater Syria, encompassing the area 
currently denominated as the Levant (including Palestinians, Lebanese and Syrians). 
7 Gómez primarily focuses on ‘possible’ African Muslims, but also identifies five possible ‘Arab’ Muslims 
originating from the Ottoman heartland and Morocco; however, he does not appear to consider two 
individuals arriving from ‘Arjel’ (Algiers/Algeria) and one from Tunez (Tunis/Tunisia) as ‘possible 
Muslims’ (33). Interestingly, Morales-Mesa recognises that slaves arriving in Cuba included “Muslims, 
Arabs and Berbers”, thereby drawing an implicit typological separation between these three groups, rather 
than analysing the potential overlaps between religious and ethnic identies (2002, 94). 
8 Regarding Chinese immigration to Cuba, López notes that Chinese associations in the early-20th Century 
“gave new Chinese migrants their Western names” (2009, 179), indicating that such processes of 
hispanisation have continued across time and space. 
9 Broader methodological difficulties arise, partly, from the applicability of the category “immigrant” only 
to those travelling in third class, and due to the different national and ethnic labels used in registers at 
different points of the 19th and 20th Centuries (Charon 1992, 40). Such labels shifted over time: the term 
“Arabia” emerged in the early-20th Century to encompass Lebanon, Syria and Palestine (Menéndez-Paredes 
1999), and the categories “Iraqi” and “Libyan” were used from the 1930s (Charon 1992). 
10 In 1940, the new Cuban Constitution facilitated family reunification, increase both Chinese and Arab 
immigration to the island (López 2009, 180). 
11 At the risk of “footnoting” a “parenthetic minority,” it is notable that Al-Ahari proposes that by 1959, the 
majority of Muslims in Cuba were Chinese Muslims (1999, 447). Whilst requiring further examination, this 
claim raises questions surrounding the displacement of Islam not only in studies of Arab migration to Cuba, 
but also within studies of Chinese migration, pushing Scherer and other analysts to consider the 
significance of non-Confucian Chinese religions, such as Islam, in Chinese-Cuban experiences. 
12 Between 1869 and 1931, 20,565 Arab immigrants are officially recorded as having arrived in Cuba 
(Menéndez-Paredes 1998, 53). The 1953 Census is the first to have collected the number of Arabs residing 
in Cuba (Charon 1992, 46), meaning that estimates for the 1930s largely derive from Cuban analysts’ 
extrapolations from the official Registries (quoted in ibid).  
13 The Classical Arabic term is misbaḥa.  
14 Available at http://www.cubasolidarity.com/aboutcuba/topics/race/0311cubanarabs.htm, last accessed on 
17 June 2010. 
15 In contrast, Ortiz argued, with reference to “African” religions, that “the gods do not spontaneously die” 
in “contexts of religious transculturation” (1963, 243, author’s translation); however, whilst recognising the 
“resistance” of Afro-Cuban religious identity and practice, there is no reference to the survival of the 
religion of the “Levantines” or “Turks”. 
16 Available at http://www.cubasolidarity.com/aboutcuba/topics/race/0311cubanarabs.htm, last accessed on 
17 June 2010. 
17 Author’s compilation of Associations Registered by the Cuban state during the 1900s (Archivo Nacional 
de Cuba, 1995). 
18 I am grateful to the reviewer for highlighting this point. 
19 However, the small Shi’a Al-Ma'sumin Islamic Centre has reportedly been built with funding from the 
Iranian government (US DOS 2009). 
20 Morales-Mesa refers to the support provided by Muslim communities from the Arab Emirates, Qatar, 
Canada, Panama and Brazil (p. 99). 
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21 Although a small community, my research in 2006 confirms that a number of Cubans unrelated to the 
earlier waves of Arab migration have indeed converted to Islam, at times through interactions with Muslim 
students and diplomats (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2010c). 
